We develop a theoretical model where the nature of large investments (CAPEX, R&D and Working Capital) affects the financing choice during the investment period.
Introduction
Initial corporate finance studies focus largely on the relationship between capital structure and firm value. Since Modigliani and Miller's propositions, many papers developed theories in attempting to explain this relationship, but, until now, none of them achieved consensus among researchers. Hall (1992) advocates that this cause and effect relationship perhaps is incomplete when only these two dimensions are considered. Therefore, it is required to include a third one: investments. The inclusion of this new dimension not only elucidate all questions that remain unanswered, but creates others. To explore how this three-dimensional interaction works, it is crucial to establish causal effect across them.
Hereupon, the nature of investment may play an important role because their specific characteristic affects firms' and project's attributes, such as agency costs and expected pledgeable income to support new financing contracts. Dudley (2012) shows that large investments are financed, firstly, with (internal and external) equity and, as these investments are converted into assets-in-place, firms issue debt in order to balance financial flexibility and the costs and benefits of debt in a way consistent with the Trade-off Theory. However, it is notorious that as Dudley (2012) uses just an aggregate investment measure (i.e. the sum of CAPEX, R&D and working capital (WC)), particularities of each type of investment were overlapped by capital expenditure as it represents the largest amount during the entire period. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the evolution of investment over time both in (nominal) amount and in relative terms.
In absolute terms, CAPEX has been increasing over time, reaching almost US$ 1 trillion dollars in 2006. In turn, during the period from 1978 to 2006, R&D has not exceeded 40% of the amount invested in CAPEX. WC is even less representative than R&D, representing at most 11% of CAPEX. After we scale the amount by total assets, the scenario alters:
while the investment in R&D has been increasing sharply over time, CAPEX has been decreasing over time. In 2006, for instance, the investment of R&D and CAPEX relative to total assets were similar. Dudley (2012), Öztekin and Flannery (2012) , Ovtchinnikov (2010) , Faulkender et al. (2012) , Zhou et al. (2016) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) , Chang et al. (2014) , among others, advocate the existence of a target leverage behavior through strong empirical evidence.
In addition, Graham and Harvey (2001) survey concludes that the majority of the firms either has a target ratio or a range of leverage upon which their decisions are based.
Literature lists the adjustment costs as the determinant of the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure. In this sense, Faulkender et al. (2012) defend the cash flow to be a source of adjustment cost sinking: the excess and the lack of cash flow require a manager's active access to capital market to either raise or distribute cash, making marginal the adjustment costs, increasing the speed of adjustment. Analogously to cash flow, Dudley (2012) advocates that large investments play a similar role. As large investments require an amount of resources that firms usually do not have, they usually need to access the capital markets to raise them. In this sense, if managers pursuit a target leverage, the investment period represents an appropriate period to adjust. Even though the author acknowledges the role of investment in this matter, questions related to the effect of its nature remain unanswered.
In order to fill some of these gaps, our purpose is to provide evidence that helps answering the following questions: Does the type of large projects affect the financing decisions over the investment period? By type of investment, we refer to CAPEX, R&D and work-ing capital. Also, we extend our analysis to verify whether these decisions change during the investment period consistent with the predictions of the traditional corporate finance theories, to be known: Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Hypothesis and Market Timing.
Extending Dudley (2012) , we defend that the type of investment is a determinant of financing behavior during the investment period. Our identification relies on the assumption that the nature of investment affects the pledgeable income related to the project that, in turn, affect temporarily the feasibility and optimality of the debt contract. To support this assumption, we develop a theoretical model based on the Tirole (2006) , where we decompose the probability of success of a project into two probabilities: an idiosyncratic one that depends on the nature of the investment and managers' behavior probability.
Our model results in three propositions. Our first and general proposition is that, if a manager intends to hide project information from the market, a debt contract may not be temporarily feasible. Our second states that R&D investments are too risky to support a debt contract, while in the third one we propose that debt may not be the sole optimal contract for R&D projects.
We use a sample comprised by annual data available on COMPUSTAT that refers to the 1978-2006 period. Our results show that, first, no traditional theory is able to solely explain firms financing behavior during non-investment period: firms tend to use equity even when there is borrowing capacity and firms issue equity when share prices are high and make capital structure decisions pursuing a target leverage. Second, there are extensive differences across projects due to their nature.
Investment in CAPEX are considered a double-edged sword on corporate finance. On one side, these assets are credit multipliers (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) , since they work as a support for more borrowings due to their capacity to be used as collateral for further investment (Almeida and Campello, 2007) . On the other side, if the investment is debtfinanced, firms may initially pay down this obligation with other projects' cash flow, reducing firms' financial flexibility and increasing the likelihood of financial distress. Other problem regards to the managerial behavior: if a project is initially financed with debt, firms may face managers' asset substitution behavior.
Our general proposition adds other perspective in this matter that relies on the temporary non-feasibility of the debt contract due to asymmetric information. As the contract becomes doable, firms would use debt rather than (internal and/or external) equity. The practical implication of our proposition is that firms decrease leverage and increase their deviation from leverage target at the initial stages of the investment period and as the project evolves, leverage increases and, consequently, the deviation decreases. Our results related to CAPEX support this proposition.
At the initial stages of the CAPEX investment period, we evidence that firms become more underlevered than they already are at the preceding year of the investment period, when firms retire a substantial amount of debt 1 . At these stages, firms use preferentially equity to finance it and, as the project evolves, we observe a decrease in the deviation from target leverage as a response to an increase in leverage: the issuance probability increases 0.42% with the execution of 1% of the project. This within-project financing sequence is consistent with our first proposition. Our results of the effect of financial constraints shows that constrained firms are more intensely affected than unconstrained ones, making them increase the use of equity during initial stages until the last one, where the additional asset and the income pledgeability increase the borrowing capacity. Because adjustment is costly, the speed of adjustment varies over the investment period to weight the need for cash and the benefits and costs from adjustment. At initial stages, where there is a need for immediate cash, the speed increases and the equity is replaced by debt in a way that the firm appropriates the entire benefit of debt without additional adjustment costs.
Our extension test shows that just the underlevered firms anticipate the adjustment as a response to cash flow.
The R&D literature provides arguments that support our specific R&D propositions, whose practical implication is that the leverage decreases during the entire investment period, as a response of an equity financing choice. Hall (1992) evidences a negative relationship between debt and R&D, and asserts that the primary source of investment 1 We use a measure of net debt issuance as the sum of the debt repayment and debt issuance is internal equity. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) provide results that reinforce Hall's. cite the debt contract is not suitable for skewed and uncertain returns, lower assets pledgeability, adverse selection problems and high marginal cost of financial distress as the reasons for the debt aversion for intangible-intensive firms. As consequence, if a R&D firm runs out internal resources, external equity is preferred to debt ).
Consistent with our propositions, we observe a decreasing leverage during the entire R&D investment period. This is result of a persistent net debt retirement and net equity issuance, which probabilities increase over stages. The execution of 1% of the R&D project increases 0.18% the probability of a debt retirement and/or use of equity. This behavior, in turn, is also consistent with Trade-off predictions in which growth increases the financial distress likelihood and, therefore, should not be financed with debt. However, our results
show that managers do not take the advantage of the marginal adjustment costs period to adjust their capital structure, even if the project generates cash flow earlier than planned.
Similar to what we observe in CAPEX, financial constraints affect more constrained than unconstrained firms.
The majority of WC empirical studies either focus on its relationship with profitability (Deloof, 2003) , or evaluate components individually (Hill et al., 2010 , Chiou et al., 2006 .
Scarce papers, however, establish the possible relationship between capital structure decisions and WC management. First, researchers has difficulty of interpretation because it may capture growth opportunities, sales strategy or bargaining power over suppliers.
The second reason is a consequence of the first: WC is extremely endogenous. Despite the difficulties, Chiou et al. (2006) , to our knowledge, are the first to investigate the WC determinants. As a result, later reinforced by Hill et al. (2010) and Baños-Caballero et al. (2010) , the authors find a negative relationship between WC and leverage, even though some components can be used as collateral for debt contracts Petersen, 1993, Almeida and Campello, 2007) , increasing firms' borrowing capacity. As WC management is strategic to any firm, managers tend to avoid funding that requires monitoring, information sharing or issuance costs.
Even though our WC results do not support our general proposition, we evidence that firms do not have an issuance preference (debt or equity) to finance a large WC project. However, we find that managers make financing decisions taking into account the deviation from target leverage and the source is chosen aiming its reduction. In fact, we capture a substantial net debt retirement at the preceding year of the investment period.
This evidence is consistent with Chiou et al. (2006) . They argue that, as high debt ratio could decrease the daily operational cash, managers may have problems in managing WC efficiently and to take last minute commercial advantages. Besides that, the mean amount invested in WC is lower than half of CAPEX and R&D, implying a higher fixed cost per dollar raised through an issuance. Our results support this argument. As the investment starts, the level of security issuance drops to 0. Similarly to CAPEX and R&D, the effect of financial constraints in this type of investment affects more constrained than unconstrained firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the Section 2, we develop our theoretical model. Section 3 presents the data, variables of interest and the definition of investment. In the Section 4, we present and discuss the effects of the nature of the investment on the capital structure decisions during the investment period. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
No reward in failure state
Our theoretical model is adapted from Tirole (2006) . Suppose that a firm, owned by an entrepreneur, with cash equals to A wants to undertake an investment I, and as A < I, the entrepreneur has to raise funds that equals to I − A. If undertaken, the project has the probability of success and failure equal to p and 1 − p, respectively. If the project succeeds, the project yields RI, proportional to I, and 0, if fails. In the following scheme, we present this rational. 
Accordingly, if the entrepreneur behaves, the probability of success will be p i + ε and if she misbehaves, p i , where p i + ε>p i . In case of misbehavior, the entrepreneur expropriates private benefits of BI, proportional to I. To limit I as finite and to impose that A> 0, we establish that:
We impose that NPV is positive only if entrepreneur behaves : (p i + ε)R > 1 and negative if entrepreneur misbehaves: 1 > (p i R + B). The loan agreement establishes that the net revenue R is split between the lender's (R L ) and the borrower's portion (R B ),
where R = R L + R B . Also, the loan contract is subject to two constraints:
The incentive constraints (IC) is interpreted as follows: the increase in the borrower's revenue portion by behaving has to be at least equal to the private benefit received by the entrepreneur if she misbehaves. The break-even constraint (IBe), in turn, imposes that the project's pledgeable income has to be as big as the amount borrowed from the investors.
We define the entrepreneur's net utility to be equal to the total surplus resultant from the investment: U B = ((p i + ε)R − 1)I. As the entrepreneur tends to maximize her own utility, she will invest as much as possible, subject to the aforementioned constraints.
Reward in failure state
So far, we establish the conditions to enable a loan agreement between the borrower and lender. However, the funding structure is still undetermined. Suppose, now, that the entrepreneur has 100% of the shares of the firm, and intends to finance the investment I through equity issuance. So, in exchange of 1 − α of the firm, the investors agree to finance the project. In this case, the entrepreneur, in turn, would have the remainder α of the firm.
In case of success, the return of the project R S , is split in a way that the investors take (1 − α)R S while the entrepreneur, αR S . However, in case of failure, the entrepreneur takes αR F , where R F is the liquidation value of the assets. The latter is determined by the demand of secondary asset markets that, in turn, is negatively related to the asset uniqueness. We define R to be equal to the increase in profit given success, i.e.
The existence of a reward in case of failure implies that the marginal NPV per unit of investment is (p i + ε)R + R F > 1, while the marginal pledgeable income is negative
, condition that imposes finitude to I. Then, the entrepreneur's utility is:
The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur's expected compensation in a way that:
subject to the following new constraints:
Including IBe a is the objective function, the entrepreneur's utility is, then:
Suppose, finally, that optimal contract is the equity issuance. Therefore, R 
In this case, IBe a is slack, a contradiction. Accordingly, the optimal contract (first-best)
is the one where R F B = 0, that is, a debt contract.
Proposition 1: A debt contract is not feasible if the investor's probability of success goes below a feasibility threshold, p * i , deviating from the entrepreneur's probability of success.
Suppose that the same entrepreneur does not want to share information related to a specific project to the market as a result of commercial strategy. As the entrepreneur is known by the market, ε is known too. We, then, assume that IC holds. 
, the contract is not feasible. However, over time, as the investment evolves and starts generating positive cash flow, the market may capture this positive signs through financial and operational reports, asymmetry decreases until
and the contract becomes feasible.
Proposition 2: Because of the risky nature of R&D projects, debt contract may not be feasible.
Suppose a firm, whose entrepreneur is known by the market, wants to undertake one R&D and one CAPEX projects. We assume that the market evaluates the projects sep-
violated and debt contract is not feasible.
Proposition 3: Because of the uniqueness of R&D projects, debt contract may not be the sole optimal contract.
The argument that refutes the optimality of equity contracts is that if R F > 0, IBe a is slack and this contract is not an optimal choice. However, we can interpret R F as the liquidation value of the new investment assets whose value is determined by the secondary assets markets. As the liquidation value is negatively related to uniqueness, we defend that R F may be 0, implying that equity and debt issuances are able to maximize the entrepreneur's utility without any bounding constraints (IC a and IBe a ) being slack.
3 Data, Sample and Variables
Data and Sample
The sample features the annual data from COMPUSTAT for the period from 1978 to 2006.
Financial (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4949) are excluded. We also exclude firms with missing total assets or common equity, total assets lower than US$ 10 million, and firms that experienced either an annual assets or annual sales growth greater than 100% ,to avoid mergers & acquisitions. Because we analyze investment over the years, we impose that firms should have at least 5 consecutive observations. To decrease the effect of outliers, we winsorize all the variables at 1 st and 99 th percentile and we censor leverage to be between 0 and 1.
Investment variables
Our measure for CAPEX is:
where TA is the total assets and CHE is cash and short term investments. We define working capital as:
where ACT is the current asset, LCT is the current liabilities and DLC is the short term debt. The investment in working capital is, then, the difference between the one period and the contemporaneous working capital, as follows:
Finally, our measure of R&D expenses is as follows:
where XRD is the total research and development expenses.
Definition of investment projects and stages
We based on Dudley (2012) to define investment projects. We, therefore, follow his procedures: the beginning of a large investment occurs when the firm's investment rate is equal or greater than 1.5 times the median rate in its industry (3-digit SIC). The end of this project, consequently, occurs when the firm's investment rate drops to a level lower than 1.5 times its industry median. As we define investment project as a multiplier of industry's investment rate, we occasionally face two situation: consecutive investment years and overlapping investment (e.g. more than 1 project occurring simultaneously) in a given year.
As in Dudley (2012), because we are not able to exactly distinguish when a project begins and ends when they occur in consecutive years, we treat them as one project.
Regarding large investments that occur in the same year, we follow Dudley's (2012) procedure: in projects with length greater than 5 years, we considered a new investment project every time that the investment rate in a given year is equal or greater than 1.5 times the firm's investment rate in the previous years since the beginning of the original project. To illustrate the procedure, suppose a firm A whose investment rate in 1990 raises to 3% while its industry median is 2%. Therefore, we label 1990 as a first investment year.
In addition, suppose that this firm keeps its investment rate greater than 2% until 2000 when it drops to 1%. We now have a 10-year-investment period. However, applying a within period analysis, we observe that in the first 5 years the investment rate remains 3%, and from 1995 on, it raises to 4.5% (1.5 × 3%), remaining flat until 2000. Following Dudley's procedures, we would split this 10-year-period into two, i.e. from 1990 to 1994 and from 1995 to 2000. Table 1 reports the distribution of the projects in our sample. Before the split procedure, as we exemplify above, our sample comprises 9,140 CAPEX projects whose mean length is 2.51 years, 2,475 R&D projects whose mean length is 5.42 years and 11,213 WC projects whose mean length is 1.17 year. After the split, we observe an increase on the number of CAPEX projects (9,354 projects with mean length of 2.45 years) and on the number of R&D projects (3,053 projects with mean length of 4.39 years).
As we intend to analyze accurately the average financing behavior during each type of investment, we disregard the years in which a given firm underwent more than one type of investment. After this restriction, our final sample is comprised 7,371 CAPEX projects of a mean investment: US$ 179 million (or 15% of total assets); 1,448 R&D projects of a mean investment: US$ 156 million (or 14.9% of total assets) and 11,213 WC projects of a mean investment: US$ 73 million (or 8.9% of total assets). In order to uniform the analysis of the projects, we categorize the periods into stages.
For CAPEX and R&D projects, we split the investment period into terciles; Stages 1, 2 and 3 refer to the years that belongs to the bottom 33 th , from 33 th to 66 th and to the top 33 th percentile of the investment period distribution, respectively. Because of the shorter length of WC projects, we split the investment period into two categories based on the median: Stages 1 and 2 refer to the years that belong to the bottom 50 th and top 50 th of the investment period distribution, respectively. We, then, establish Stage 0 as the year that immediately precedes the investment period.
Summary Statistics
The literature provides extensive specification referring to the estimation of target leverage. Following prior literature (Flannery and Rangan, 2006 , Flannery and Hankins, 2013 , Dudley, 2012 , Chang et al., 2014 , our predicted target leverage is the fitted value from the regression of contemporary actual leverage on lagged firms characteristics, controlled by firm and year fixed-effects. In the Equation (1), we present our specification:
where Q is the market-to-book ratio ((Total Assets -Book Equity + Market Equity)/Total Assets); P rof is the profitability (EBITDA/Total Assets), T ang is the firms' tangibility (PPENT/Total Assets); Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; SES is the selling expenses ; DR&D is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if the firm invested in R&D in a given year and R&D is the research and development expenses. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our sample. An average firm from our sample is slightly overlevered, regardless the leverage measure, is profitable and invests either in CAPEX or in R&D. We, then, split the sample into three groups: Group 1 represents the firms that underwent at least one large CAPEX project; Group 2 represents the firms that underwent at least one large R&D project and Group 3, in turn, represents the firms that we observe at least one large WC project. The results are presented by Table 3 . As expected, 79% and 84% of the sample experienced at least one large CAPEX or WC projects, respectively. Also, as expected, Group 2 represents less than one third of the entire sample and presents substantial differences in comparison with the others. When we compare across groups, firms that belong to the second one are less tangible, substantially underlevered and less indebted, issue more equity, have lower leveraged and present higher growth opportunities, consistent with the literature. during investment period of our three categories. The dash line refers to the book leverage while the solid one, to the market leverage. At Stage 0 of all types of investments firms are underlevered, mainly in the CAPEX and R&D cases, where, using book (market) measure, the initial deviations are 4.9% (5.6%) and 5.6% (6.0%). As the investment starts, we are able to observe an increase in the deviation for CAPEX and R&D: in the first case, book (market) deviation increases 1.8pp (2.6pp) while in the second one, it increases almost 2.0pp. From the Stage 2, we evidence a divergent behavior between CAPEX and R&D, consistent the essence of our theoretical model that establishes different influence in financing behavior during the stages based on the type of investment. In the CAPEX case, deviation starts decreasing in a movement consistent with the Trade-off Theory: at the Stages 2 and 3, the book (market) deviation decreases to 5.5% (6.8%) and 3.1% (3.7%), respectively. So far, the evidence referring to CAPEX is consistent with our Proposition 1. Regarding to R&D, this analysis is not enough to deliberate the consistency with our Propositions 2 and 3.
On the other hand, in the case of WC, the evolution of the deviation from target is not supportive to our Proposition 1. In fact, it seems that managers take the opportunity at which the adjustment costs are sunk and choose the financing source in a way to adjust their capital structure toward firms' target. since the results is not conclusive to affirm that managers prefer equity than debt to finance large working capital projects. Facing the capital structure behavior that we evidence in the CAPEX and R&D in-vestment periods, one could justify the behavior using inertia hypothesis: the firm being underlevered at Stage 0 means an a priori preference for (internal or external) equity; and, therefore, during an investment period of both natures, managers choose the usual source to finance them, maintaining their underlevered status. To test this hypothesis, we split our samples into subsets, imposing the firm to be overlevered at Stage 0 for both cases.
Our results presented in the Figure 
Financial deficit during stages
In this subsection, we explore the explanatory capacity of the corporate finance theories (Trade-off, Pecking Order and Market Timing) to explain the financing behavior during a large investment. According to Pecking Order (PO), firms have a financing preference for internal resources and debt; if the need is not fulfilled by these two sources, firms issue equity. Therefore, if firms behave according to PO during the investment periods, the change in the leverage should be completely explained by the financial deficit (net equity issuance plus net debt issuance, scaled by total assets) (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999 , Dudley, 2012 , Frank and Goyal, 2003 .
If managers behave according to Market Timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) during investment period, we should observe that, as the share price rises, the managers would prefer tp issue equity instead of debt. In order to analyze this behavior, we follow Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Dudley (2012) and include an interaction variable of F D and Q.
This variable captures the effect of the market value on the financial deficit. If managers indeed time the market in order to take advantage of high share prices, we would see a negative and significant coefficient on this variable during the stages.
We also include two variables to capture the adherence of the capital structure decisions to Trade-off theory: Deviation t−1 and ∆T arget . This theory predicts the deviation from target to be negatively related to the change in leverage during non-investment period, intensifying during the investment period. So, if firms make financing decisions to close the gap between target and actual leverage, the coefficient of Deviation t−1 should be negative and ∆T arget, positive. Equation 2 presents our final specification:
where θStages n represents a vector of dummy variables that refer to the project's stage of each type of investment.
le's length, we split into two subtables (4(a) and 4(b)) to facilitate the reading. We present the results regarding to non-investment period in Table 4 (a). Consistent with Dudley (2012) , the financial deficit presents coefficient far from the predicted by Pecking
Order, varying from 36.8% to 42%, being an evidence that debt is not the sole financing choice. The negative coefficient on Deviation t−1 and the positive coefficient on ∆T arget are evidence that the changes in the actual leverage, at non-investment periods, are related to the pursuit of a target leverage. Finally, the negative coefficient on the interaction variable F D i,t × Q t−1 indicates that, at non-investment periods, changes in leverage are negatively related to high shares prices, even when we use book leverage, rejecting the mechanical explanation for the relationship, which suggests that managers time the market to issue equity when share prices are high. In a nutshell, the results indicate that no corporate finance theory solely is able to explain firms' financing decisions, at non-investment periods. We interpret these coefficients as evidence that, during these stages, the non feasibility of a debt contract and a need for substantial amount of resources makes firms resort to equity. For instance, at Stage 2, the coefficients represents a relative increase of equity almost 30%. At the last stage, consistent with our theoretical model, the use of debt increases to a level similar to the non-investment period, consistent with the U-shaped slope in Figure 2 (a). Regarding Market Timing variable, no coefficient shows significance at any stages, implying that managers do not time the market during investment periods more intensively than they do at non-investment period. This evidence reinforces our identification: the use of equity in the initial stages is not a response to high share prices but a temporary non-feasibility of the debt contract. The meaning of the coefficient of It is important to mention, though, that the lack of significance of all variables that we include to capture the adherence of financing decisions to capital structure theories does not allow us to affirm that R&D firms does not follow any of them. In fact, the results, so far, suggest that intangible-intensive firms do not seem: (1) to adjust their capture structure when adjustment costs are marginal, (2) to follow the hierarchical financing preference predicted by POH and (3) to time the market to issue equity when share prices are high. However, the Trade-off Theory predicts that, as growth increases the costs of financial distress and exacerbates the asset substitution problem (Frank and Goyal, 2009 ), investments on growth, as R&D, should be financed with equity. By this perspective, the leverage behavior observed in the last subsection is consistent with Trade-Off Theory. supports what we observe graphically: firms choose the financing source in order to decrease the gap between actual leverage and target. Overall, the results corroborates the graphical analysis reported in the prior subsection. 
Financial deficit under financial constraints
The effect of financial constraints on financing decisions has been scrutinized for the last 30 years. Many papers provide evidence that financial constrained firms behave differently from unconstrained ones (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003 , Faulkender et al., 2012 , Dudley, 2012 . In order to analyze the effect of financial constraints during different types of projects, we split the sample based on credit rating. The use of having or not credit rating as a financial constraints measure has been extensive in literature. Faulkender and Wang (2006) state that unrated firms have no access to capital markets, where interest rates are more competitive, and, therefore, have to raise external resources through expensive contracts with financial intermediaries.
As the table is lengthy, we proceed in the same way as in Table 4 . Tables 5(a) The similarity of the coefficient of the F D × Q indicates that, regardless the presumable greater difficulty for the constrained firms to issue equity, managers tend to take the opportunity and issue when share prices are high. As we state in the previous subsection, the financing behavior of our sample firms cannot be solely explained by a singular capital structure theory. We observe in Table 5 (b) that in the case of CAPEX, financially constrained firms have their behavior more affected during the investment period. At Stage 0, we attest that just constrained firms show a significant effect of the financing deficit on changes in leverage. At the initial stages of investment, the financing deficit decreases the explanation power over the leverage change. This suggests that, as the investment starts, the uncertainty over the projects increases, hampering borrowing capacity of financially con-strained firms, that during non-investment period already face difficulties to raise external resources, making it necessary to increase alternative financing rather than debt. At the last stage, when projects have already breaking-even, implying that marginal pledgeable income can support new financing contracts, firms increase the use of debt. We refer to marginal pledgeable income as the additional pledgeable income to that originated at non-investment period.
On the other hand, unconstrained firms, that have an easier access to external resources and are more flexible to choose the financing sources at any stages, anticipate partially the need for external equity to undertake the project from Stage 1 to Stage 0, even though share prices seem not to influence the magnitude of equity issuance. Because of the significant and negative coefficient of Deviation for both group of firms, we interpret this results as an indicative that firms, homogeneously, tend to change their leverage in a way consistent with Trade-off theory.
In the case of R&D, we show that constrained firms have a similar behavior to the same group that undertakes CAPEX projects. During the entire investment period, including
Stage 0, these firms increase the amount of equity as a response of a greater difficulty in raising external capital due to the uncertainty related to the project. At the last stage, when uncertainty drops considerably, these firms tend to increase debt in an sufficient amount to return to the capital structure similar to the one observed at non-investment period. The positive coefficient of F D × Q is consistent with this perspective: firms facing simultaneously financial constraints and need for resources, decrease the sensibility to share prices and raise external equity, regardless if the price is high or low. Finally, we also observe the financial constraints effects in working capital projects. As expected, the results suggest that financially constrained firms use equity more frequently than unconstrained firms, regardless if the shares prices are high or low. 
Financing sources
In this subsection, we analyze the financing sources during the investment stages. While our general proposition predicts that during initial stages firms uses equity and, as the project evolves, it is replaced by debt, the R&D propositions affirm that just equity is used to finance this type of investment. Besides that, corporate finance theories also predicts a financing sequence: while Pecking Order hypothesis predicts preference for debt issuance instead of equity, Trade-off Theory predicts that firms tend to issue equity before debt during an investment period, consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2001) , that recognizes that firms tend to use more debt to finance assets-in-place and more equity to finance growth.
To test these sequencing hypotheses, we use logistic regressions where the dependent variables assume 1 if the firm issues debt and 0 if equity is issued. We consider a security issuance if the amount issued is equal or greater than 5% of the total asset in the beginning of the year. Following the procedures of Hovakimian et al. (2001) , Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Dudley (2012) , we exclude firm-years observations where we observe dual issuances or neither equity nor debt is issued. As control variables, we include Korajczyk and Levy's (2003) macroeconomics variables that may affect issuance decisions. Table 6 reports results of the determinants of security issuance. We include years fixed-effects and omit the constant and the control variables, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. Using an aggregated investment measure, Dudley (2012) finds that, as the project evolves, the probability of a debt issuance increases, showing a preference for debt in the later stages. Our results presented in the third, fifth and seventh columns of Table   6 cast doubts on the generalization of his results: the coefficients of Stages shows that Dudley's conclusion is only valid for CAPEX projects. The variable Stages refers to the percentage evolution of the project and is defined as the investment year divided by the total length of the project. In fact, the results presented on the second and third columns confirm the aforementioned evidence: firms are more likely to issue equity during the initial stages, while debt issuance is more likely to occur at the final stages of CAPEX projects. This evidence is consistent with our first proposition. 
Speed of Adjustment
In this section, we use the partial adjustment model to estimate the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure. In Equation (3), we present the usual specification form:
where Lev * i,t represents the target leverage, that we estimate according to the specification presented by Equation (1), while λ represents the speed at which firms adjust their leverage. By definition, the speed of adjustment (SOA) varies from 0 and 1, where 0 represents no adjustment and 1 represents immediate adjustment toward the target. In turn, literature evidences annual SOA that varies from 25% to 40% (Flannery and Rangan, 2006 , Flannery and Hankins, 2013 , Chang et al., 2014 , Zhou et al., 2016 , Borochin and Yang, 2017 . We estimate Equation (3) using OLS estimator, controlling for year and firms fixed-effects. Table 7 reports the results. For brevity, we omit the constant. At non-investment periods, firms adjust annually their capital structure at a speed that varies from 38.6% to 47.7%, i.e. firms, on average, take from 1.37 to 1.07 year to fill half of the deviation from target. During CAPEX, the SOA shows significant variation:
at Stage 0, the SOA shows an increase that varies from 5.6% to 11.7% in comparison with the estimated at non-investment period. This result is expected since the debt retirement evidenced in Figure 5 (a) may cause substantial adjustment in capital structure, captured by the coefficient. As the investment begins, the SOAs do not present substantial changes in comparison with the one during non-investment period. We hypothesize that the SOA varies during the investment period because firms weight their needs for cash and the adjustment benefits and costs, and these weights may vary during the period. At initial stages 2 , where there is an immediate need for resources and/or immediate change in the capital structure for the subsequent periods, firms adjust faster, even this could mean an increase in the deviation, as our case. However, during the projects stages of investment, where the need for cash is less urgent and the project may be generating cash, firms manage their capital structure in a way to balance financial flexibility and the adjustment benefits and costs, even if this means slower SOA.
During R&D investment period, as expected, we do not evidence any consistent variation on SOA in comparison with the estimated during non-investment period. Even though firms that undertake R&D projects retire debt and issue equity during investment period, not only the amount is not enough to cause a sudden change in a capital structure but also, as we show previously, financing decisions for this type of investment is not made in a way consistent with adjustment behavior. This is not the same case of WC.
Analyzing the variation of the estimated SOA jointly with prior evidence, we interpret the faster SOA at Stage 0 as a result arising from the substantial debt retirement that, in turn, diverts downwardly firms' capital structure from their target (Figure 2(c) ). As the investment begins, firms finance the project with the source that enables the reduction of their deviation from target, captured by the significant coefficient at Stage 2.
Effect of cash flow on the speed of adjustment
As an important driver for the SOA, the transaction costs are generated through the managers' active access to capital markets in some way, either to distribute cash for shareholders or to issue securities. Faulkender et al. (2012) show that both negative and positive cash flow positively affect the incentive for firms to access the market, since cash superavit or deficit demand a managers' active behavior to access the market to either decrease the cash excess or to fulfill the cash deficit. Their results support firms' adjustment behavior and confirm their hypothesis that managers use this market access, when the adjustment costs are sunk, to adjust their capital structure.
In this sense, if a project is generating cash flow during the investment period, we would be able to observe the same effect on the SOA. We hypothesize that if the project is generating positive cash flow, firms anticipate their financing behavior to the initial stages in order to benefit from the adjustment that would occur at Stages 2 and 3. The positive cash flow signs to the market about the success of the project, increasing firms' asset pledgeability, enabling firms to repurchase share if underlevered or to retire debt if overlevered. On the other hand, if the project is generating negative cash flow, firms may make financing decisions in order to offset the firm value loss caused by the cash flow. We, then, use operating income before depreciation to proxy projects cash flow. Normalsized projects may not be able to affect operating cash flow, but large ones that alter the capital structure would. Because some projects may generate negative operating cash flow but positive in aggregated measure that considers the financial and taxes gains, we subtract the paid interest and taxes. Therefore, our measure for project's cash flow is as follows:
where OIBD is the operating income before depreciation; T is the interest taxes; I is the interest paid. We collect these three variables from the cash flow statement. IN V EST is the firm's investment expenditure.
We use Faulkender's specification to properly investigate this matter. Following their procedures, we decompose the right side of Equation (3) as a function of the cash flow and the deviation from target in order to capture the effect of cash flow in four situations:
• Excess of cash flow ≡ (|CF | −|Dev|) × (1 − DevLarger) Equation (6) presents the full specification:
where DevLarger is a dummy variable that we use to split the cases when the deviation is larger than the cash flow. The measure of debt (Lev p ) is built to not consider the cases when leverage changes passively such as the changes due to positive net income.
Therefore, the debt is measure as:
where DLC and DLTT is the short-term and long-term debt in period t-1, respectively; NI is the net income. In this case, when the changes in the leverage is due to the results, the left side of the Equation (6) is zero. As Faulkender et al. (2012) , during the non-investment period, when the deviation is larger than the absolute cash flow, we expect to observe a given SOA at the level in which |Dev| and |CF | are overlapped (γ 1 ) and, from |CF | to the target (γ 2 ), SOA may decrease, but it may still remain positive and significant. For firms whose absolute cash flow is larger than the deviation, we expect the firms to adjust their capital structure at a given SOA (γ 3 ) the entire deviation and after the target, where the cash exceeds the target, we expect the SOA (γ 4 ) to drop to 0. In a nutshell, we expect the following coefficients: γ 1 ≈ γ 2 = γ 3 > γ 4 = 0. During investment period, we expect to observe positive coefficients at the initial stages as an evidence of the anticipation or offset hypotheses. Also, we expect to observe positive coefficients at final stages as an indicative of the adjustment behavior already evidenced in the prior subsections of this paper. case. The coefficients that refer to the non-investment period are consistent with our hypothesis. The F-tests between γ 1 and γ 2 and between γ 2 and γ 3 show no statistical difference across them at the level of 5% and, although γ 4 is statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is not economic significant. Also, consistent with Faulkender et al. (2012) , the higher SOA for overlevered firms is consistent with the authors' results:
overlevered firms seem to benefit more from the adjustment than underlevered firms. During the investment period, our results reinforce the existence of differences across the types of investments and how firms deal with this differences according to their positive relative to target. It is important to mention that the negative coefficients in the results for overlevered firms refer to the direction of the adjustment. Panel A refers to CAPEX.
For underlevered firms, the positive coefficients for, γ 2 and γ 3 during the first stages, and for γ 2 , the second stage are consistent with our anticipation and offset hypotheses: the higher the absolute cash flow at the initial stages, the greater the motivation to anticipate their capital structure adjustment. For overlevered, although the results contradicts our hypotheses of the effect of cash flow and adjustment, the coefficients depict a behavior consistent with the financing sequencing behavior: the positive coefficients at final stages suggest that debt is issued even though their overlevered condition. We hypothesize that, in this case, the benefit from the adjustment is smaller than the benefits arising from the financial flexibility and the agency issues.
Panel B refers to R&D investment period. The lack of significance of the coefficients for all stages reinforces that firms undertaking large R&D investment does not make financing decision taking into account their target, even if the project yields early cash flow. The bottom panel refers to WC: in the case of underlevered firms, cash flow affects positively the adjustment only when the cash flow realization is lower than deviation, but not enough to increase the SOA for the entire deviation. If firms are overlevered, we evidence a financing behavior similar to the CAPEX: the financing decision seems to increase the deviation, suggesting that these firms do not benefit enough from the adjustment to undertake it.
Conclusion
This paper aims to show how the nature of the investments (CAPEX, R&D and working capital) affects the capital structure decisions during the period when a large investment is undertaken. Our identification assumption is that the type of investment affects the income pledgeability of the project and the contract feasibility. Therefore, we develop a theoretical model that emerges three propositions: (1) a debt contract may not be temporarily feasible if managers want to hide information from market; (2) because of the risky nature of R&D investments, a debt contract may be not feasible and (3) equity may share the contract optimality with debt for R&D projects.
Our results related to CAPEX are consistent with our first proposition. During large CAPEX investment period, firms increase their deviation from target, temporarily, increasing the use of equity to finance the initial stages of the investment. As the project evolves, firms increase the use of debt, decreasing the deviation from target. The probability of a debt issuance increases 0.42% as the project progresses 1%. Even though this behavior is consistent with the Trade-off theory, our evidence shows that firms do not increase significantly their annual SOA during the investment period relative to the non-investment period. Our extension test regarding the effect of cash flow on the SOA shows that just underlevered firms seems to be positively affected by it.
Regarding to large R&D investment, we show results supportive to our second and third propositions. Debt seems not to be intangible-intensive firms' first-order financing source. In fact, we show that firms tend to decrease leverage as the project evolves: the probability of debt retirement and/or equity issuance increases 0.18% as the project advances 1%. During our tests, we attest that the firms do not follow predictions of neither Pecking-order Hypothesis nor Market Timing nor enjoy adjustment costs sinking to close the deviation from target leverage. However, the financing behavior adheres to the Tradeoff, consistent with the R&D literature. Finally, we evidence that managers finance large WC investments with an appropriate source to adjust their capital structure toward firms' target at marginal costs, although the within-behavior during investment period does not support our first proposition.
We contribute to the literature presenting a new causality channel whereby firms make financing decisions for large investment projects. In this sense, our results are supportive to our model. However, we are unable to provide suggestive evidence that, de facto, the results are driven by this channel.
